The Moral Dimension of Epistemic Advantage: Towards a Scanlonian Model of Standpoint Sociality
1: Introduction
The developments of standpoint feminism – which concerns the presence and dynamics of situated knowledges in a social reality with oppression - in the past three decades have been an expectedly iterative process. While cases of collaborative practice and conceptions of objectivity were revised, the call for a procedural moral model that contends with the actionable dimensions of social epistemic advantage has not been answered. In this paper, I begin laying the groundwork for such a model. Due to the flexible, non-aggregative sociality featured in T.M. Scanlon’s 1998 ethics work – What We Owe to Each Other – I shall use a Scanlonian contractualist framework to extract a broad moral foundation for agents under an epistemic advantage thesis. I contrast this to other forms of social contract theory, deeming them comparatively unsuited. My end-state strategy involves the application of a basic model of this contractualism – the “reasonable rejection” principle - to evaluate three scenarios of epistemic exchange: where advantage is conferred to others with present advantage, where advantage is conferred to others without advantage, and where advantage is not personally possessed but may be supported in an epistemic community. I then criticize my evaluations and promote next steps towards a greater resolution.
2: The salience of a moral discussion surrounding standpoint feminism and the epistemic advantage thesis
Pertaining to contemporary standpoint discourse – and for my purposes - the epistemic advantage thesis is as follows:
Groups facing oppression or underrepresentation hold standpoints that are epistemically advantageous in limited contexts; communities including epistemically advantaged members may benefit from this advantage overall. (Intemann, 2010; Wu, 2023)
Immediately, three major moral questions arise: given that there is advantage present, and it can be shared when applicable in these limited contexts,
If I am among the epistemically advantaged subgroup, and there are differing levels of epistemic advantage (given that it is unlikely this advantage is equal on all fronts), to what extent am I obligated to equalize or develop this advantage among my group?
If I am among the epistemically advantaged subgroup, to what extent am I obligated to share my advantage with the epistemically disadvantaged?
If I am among the generally advantaged, but epistemically disadvantaged subgroup, to what extent do I promote epistemic efficacy for my community as a whole?
I believe that these questions are not adequately addressed in existing standpoint dialogues. The matter has been, however, supported in several ways: Jingyi Wu’s 2023 work on a “network” standpoint epistemology explores various epistemic efficacy outcomes of communities of two subgroups of epistemic advantage and disadvantage, respectively, making clear the possibility that devaluation of agent testimony by dominant groups may confer epistemic advantage to marginalized ones. Employing Bayesian tools to construct iterative probability models of belief-learning success, she shows that, even in its base variation, the belief-learning of those with epistemic advantage will relay the success of the entire epistemic community (Wu, 2023, p.764). The relevant moral implications are strong: that epistemic advantage can be made generally beneficial through relations of testimony, and that, more broadly, the epistemic success of a community depends on actionable relations, to which agent choices are required to achieve. Presumably, these choices are not all made without principled thinking involving well-being, fairness, and reason, of which a moral groundwork would address.
Though not explicitly calling for a moral response, Susan Hekman’s 1997 Truth and Method explores several critiques of standpoint variants, questioning matters of triviality, fully capturing the varying experiences of the oppressed, and a need for appeal to a convoluted “real reality”, to which epistemically advantaged positions may access but disadvantaged ones may not (p.355). On moral matters, this conveys an urgent sense that, in standpoint discourse, the agent-to-agent relation, the agent-to-advantage relation, and the agent-to-world relation is at least, in part, fragile; they must be explored on moral grounds as a twofold means of clarification and constraint. A moral model would add the depth of personal rationale and the operations of sociality that standpoint is currently lacking, as well as, in using epistemic advantage as a clear parameter, guide this process and provide new insights into the relevant relations.
3: The choice of Scanlonian contractualism: a moral framework for the strong social epistemology of standpoint discourse
I shall now support my position towards choosing Scanlonian contractualism as a basis for my moral response. Going forward, I will use “contractualism” in the narrow sense of “Scanlonian contractualism”, not social contract theory in the larger sense; Scanlon’s model is explicitly contractualist – a moral domain based on principles one would not reasonably reject – rather than a Hobbesian, Rawlsian, or Rousseauian moral-political model that more broadly involves an agreeable contract.
There are, now, two issues to address: 1) the choice of contractualism for its features, 2) the choice of contractualism against moral models with shared features. I shall discuss these in serial order.
The main attractive feature of contractualism as a suitable moral response to standpoint theory is its version of sociality. Helen Longino (2022) specifies a need for a stronger social picture to fully capture agent relations in epistemic discussion: rejecting four “traditional” models, including aggregation, agent-as-testimonial-responder, and group-as-unit claims, she settles on an "interactive” social model, to which relations are mutually effectual, personally engaged, and necessary in epistemic activity (p.170). This is compelling to me as groundwork for a standpoint horizon: it attempts to capture the epistemic reality of a social world, in which interactive relations are most salient to our exchange of knowledge.
In this way, contractualism meets the sociality requirement: it is simultaneously non-aggregative, reciprocal, and informed by flexibility in personal reasoning, to which standpoint holds dear but often struggles to make general. The “reasonable rejection” doctrine confers a society of mutual well-wishing and positions the question internally - “Would I reject this?” and externally - “Would others reject this?” - a common and realistic process in our everyday decision-making without pressure of a positive, universalizable principle. Scanlon does also use the term “standpoint” in the work (1998, p.202) – though not in the epistemic-advantage sense – to make clear the importance of considering possible moral responses that differ from one’s own to inform one’s moral proceedings.
Contractualism is also a suitable choice against other ethical frameworks with shared features (Ashford et al, 2018):
Contractarianism (in the Hobbesian sense), which holds that all moral agents are mutually self-interested and agreed-upon moral acts are to everyone’s self-benefit. This is not compelling for a strong model of social epistemology; minority communities under Western colonial traditions often persist in non-individualistic forms of kinship, distribution, and communication (Lavenda et al, 2020).
Utilitarianism, which holds that moral action must be towards a greater well-being end-state. Contractualism has consequentialist elements – the potential outcomes are predictive in moral decision-making – but utilitarianism is socially aggregative and moral reasoning, I find, often extends past well-being, which Scanlon acknowledges but utilitarianism, generally, does not. Again, it does not reflect the strong sociality I am compelled by.
Kantian deontology and Rawlsian “justice as fairness”, which share elements of intuition, personal reasoning, and mutual respect. Contractualism does not extend to the Kantian-Rawlsian assertion of full mutual agreement, but simply mutual non-rejection; while it appeals to social effects in decision-making, contractualism holds no “veil of ignorance”, to which I find defeats the purpose of standpoint discourse, which aims to use the differences in our current social reality to inform epistemic advantage.
4: An analysis of contractual implications by major Scanlonian tenets
I shall now turn to my basic Scanlonian model for a “standpoint ethics” pertaining to the epistemic advantage thesis. The three questions I shall attempt to answer with this model are in Section (2). My strategy will be as follows:
Provide an essential overview of an applicable Scanlonian model.
Answer the three questions using this model and appropriate examples.
4.1: A salient moral model
The groundwork for Scanlon’s contractualism is, as follows:
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement. (Scanlon, 1998, p.153; used in Ashford et al, 2018).
There are several additions to make here: “reasonableness”, to Scanlon, is not congruent to “rationality”. Reasonableness does not extend to what one ought to do to meet their moral aims most effectively but is simply “an idea with moral content” (Scanlon, 1998, p.194). This feature captures a fuller picture of moral decision-making than appealing to the most-rational in-situ, including common-sense judgements, localized-benefit judgements, and unknown-expense judgements. It also captures the iterative and diverse process of accumulating perceived moral outcomes to inform future choices, of which everyone will know differently.
Furthermore, principles are not congruent to “rules”; they are contextual tools in which reason can be mitigated. On Scanlonian terms, principles are “general conclusions about the status of various kinds of reasons for action” (Scanlon, 1998, p.199). As I understand, principles, not reasons, are the stronger justificatory power; while valid principles are “indefinite” in number (Scanlon, 1998, p.201), they weigh, induce, and remove reasons in moral decision-making, applying them to the relevant information given against what would not be acceptable. Principles are the means by which a moral act is rejected or permitted, because it selects for prohibitive normative reasoning in those circumstances.
Therefore, the process of “reasonable rejection” occurs in the negative: reasons are acted upon in moral situations whereby right and wrong are directed by normative principles that would not be rejected by those with similar motives. To illustrate, say I am made a promise by my partner that is broken, but broken due to circumstances out of their control; I may choose to forgive them, berate them, or fail to acknowledge the promise was broken at all. I choose to forgive them. My reasoning is that I find the disadvantage caused by the broken promise acceptable, given the poor circumstances, which, given my respect for my partner, assume that they would have kept the promise had these circumstances not occurred. The principle that mitigates this reasoning is contextual: I do not appeal to the categorical Do not break promises, but I appeal to the idea that Moral judgements on a moral agreement (like a promise) will be dealt with voluntariness, circumstance, and severity in mind. Given that my partner, or any other moral groups, would be similarly motivated, while they may not have agreed to forgive the broken promise, they would not reasonably reject my justification.
4.2: Standpoint ethics examined
According to this groundwork, I shall provide a moral account of the three questions from Section (2), in order. The following scenarios meet the following conditions:
Agents respect one another and value each other’s testimony; we are under conditions in which relevant epistemic exchange is appropriate (i.e. discussion of an initiative to increase X’s representation in a subgroup). We are in the context of a Western colonial society with its associated intersectionality.
4.2.1: The conference of epistemic advantage among those with existing, but differing levels of advantage.
For instance: I am a woman of colour among other women, some not of-colour. We have epistemic advantage insofar as we are women in a patriarchal sociality, but I may possess additional advantage due to the racialized dimension of my knowledge. To what extent am I to confer testimony of my experiences to provide a fuller picture of the overall experience of women?
Several moral reasonings may arise: that my testimony would be beneficial to capturing a more realistic outcome for marginalized women, that it may come at a cost of personal comfort, that it may complicate existing goals in a way I could not meaningfully mitigate. I also hold an emotional attachment to my testimony and may confer it depending on this state.
Respective principles follow: that I shall confer the most benefit to the group as a contributing member, that I shall uphold my personal comfort above a potentially complicating local benefit, that I would not risk the positive outcome for the lesser one, that I withhold information for the demise of the group.
Therefore, I may choose to do nothing; epistemic advantage is not lost, as it is conferred through oppression, which all members experience already. My “non-contributing” principle would not be reasonably rejected by the other women present; they may present their own reasons of discomfort, for example.
I may also choose to share testimony to the extent of personal will. Though with potential complications, the group benefits overall, and would not reasonably reject a principle by which overall benefit is attempted to be given to the group, despite local complications.
I may not withhold information for the failure of the group; if there is opportunity to offer racialized representation and the general success of the group depends on this opportunity, the other members – motivated by group intentions – would reject this principle and prohibit this action.
4.2.2: The conference of epistemic advantage to those with disadvantage.
For instance: I am a woman among men; other classes of oppression are not present (everyone is otherwise white, heterosexual, cisgender, etc.). To what extent am I to confer testimony of my experiences to provide a fuller picture of the experience of people in a society with oppression?
Similar moral reasonings to Scenario 4.2.1 will arise: my testimony is valuable but may come at a local or personal cost. However, this situation is more dichotomous: if I do confer my testimony, it will further group aims; if I do not confer my testimony, the group will certainly not progress. At the same time, my testimony may not be accepted; the personal cost – isolation, micro-aggressions, devaluation – may be great. Respective principles arise: I convey my advantage because others stand to learn from it and may further group goals, or I refrain from conveying my advantage because I do not feel safe. Here, we run into problems with the reasonable rejection doctrine: being in positions of dominance or underrepresentation lends itself to different motives – the dominant group may reject my latter principle because they find it unreasonable to suspect issues of safety in the first place, or may not understand the possibly unjust implications of going forward with testimony at all. However, if mutual respect includes attitudes towards understanding and reparations, these principles should not be rejected as unreasonable, even if not internalized with personal experience.
4.2.3: The support of epistemic advantage from those with epistemic disadvantage.
For instance: I am a man of the dominant group and therefore hold epistemic disadvantage in this setting. I am engaging with those with more epistemic advantage than I. To what extent shall I support the epistemic benefit provided to the whole group?
Several moral reasonings may arise: that my support may convey legitimacy to other members of the dominant group that the oppressed group may otherwise struggle with, conferring their testimonial effect more strongly. My support may also be seen as invasive or derailing, especially if I am uncertain of the outcome of what I believe to be supportive statements. I feel that offering support is a just thing to do.
Respective principles follow: I shall provide my support and ensure voice is given to oppressed members for the interests of all in the group, I shall refrain from offering any input because it is “not my place” and there is an intuitive sense of injustice, or I shall volunteer my voice for selfish means, derailing the group, which I feel may be a relevant choice because I am not used to this sort of discussion.
Would others reasonably reject these? This is where a counter-mitigating force emerges: oppressed members can enforce their own permission based on values of reparation and giving voice to the silenced. For instance, the latter principle may be rejected due to attitudes towards relevant discussion, giving voice, and respect with acknowledgement of social conditions.
5: For further development
There are problems with the applied Scanlonian model that immediately arise:
These are not exhaustive scenarios; more complex exchanges of testimony will occur. For instance, might the delivery of the testimony itself form grounds for rejection, such as in passive-aggression, gossip, or insult? If in an interactive model of sociality, even the method by which I deliver my testimony may elicit different future epistemic outcomes due to an engaged response.
Agents are often not homogenously motivated, nor homogenously respectful. Respect is not congruent to efforts made towards being respectful; this varies across cultures and may convey disrespect to those outside of that culture. Respect, as well, is not always present, especially in dynamics of epistemic exchange pertaining to oppression. Testimonial rejection or devaluation may, and does, occur (Wu, 2023). How might Scanlonian reasonable-rejection principles respond to real-world unfavourability, especially in forming responses to need for general reparations?
By nature of their intersectional experiences, agents with varying epistemic advantage and agents with epistemic disadvantage cannot be said to be similarly motivated nor be considered congruent in a moral domain contending with reparative measures. Principles – especially those founded on maintaining the status quo, or appeal to normativity – inherently bias against oppressed agents, making “reasonable rejection” too unreliable.
6: Conclusion
In this paper, I have described the beginnings of a moral groundwork for standpoint feminism. I argue that this is an urgent endeavour because, under its epistemic advantage thesis, there arises a question of principled action when this advantage is chosen to be conferred or not, or, if absent, what one might do to support those with advantage such that the whole epistemic community succeeds. I have demonstrated that Scanlonian contractualism is a pertinent starting point for such a model, contrasting its non-aggregative social features to other, similar contract-oriented options. I then provide a sketch of basic Scanlonian maxims and their applicability to three modes of advantage-relations: reasonableness, permission, and prohibition. These parameters are used to assess the three modes of advantage-relations, such that clearer courses of action are brought to the surface. Finally, I bring forth the next steps of development, including objections of respectfulness, homogeneity, and equality in a moral domain with reparations needed.
In all, the moral domain of standpoint feminism is still in its neonatal stages; Scanlonian contractualism may be one suitable option, but there may be others, and upon further analysis, it may be shown that it is actually fruitless. Regardless, my position is that the moral dimension of standpoint theory must be contended with if we are to clarify other questions of epistemic structure, exchange, position, and interpretation; if we are to do things – especially in a social context - with our epistemic faculties, we cannot escape making associated moral choices. While I aim to provide some starting point, I do believe that this matter, while urgent to clarifying standpoint relations – especially in cases of epistemic advantage – in the end, must be as iteratively designed as its predecessors.
References
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Wu, J. (2022). Epistemic advantage on the margin: A network standpoint epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 106(3), 755–777. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12895