Is Conspiracy Theorizing Epistemically Worthwhile?: An Evaluation of Clarity-Promoting Traits in Relevant Fronts of Epistemic Benefit Concerning the Anti-Sunscreen Movement
Introduction
Conspiracy theorizing seems, in general thought, to be a frivolous thing; are birds real? Is Elvis dead? It seems, however, equally wrong to say that it plays no part in our epistemic lives. Partaking in such activities – spreading the word, selling products, building rapport – may present some personal reward; Is it, however, epistemically worthwhile to do so?
It is a common consensus that for evaluations like these, conspiracy theories must be taken on a case-by-case basis (Dentith 2017, p.2244). I take interest in a subset of an emerging “conspirituality” trend (Ward & Voas, 2011): with significant membership on Tiktok, Facebook, and Instagram, it is rapidly uniting the web in a growing alternative-worldview movement, decrying scientific bases for consuming certain foods, products, and lifestyles. I use an extreme version of an anti-sunscreen ideal. Its core position is that the Sun does not cause cancer, but sunscreen does. With popular #sunscreen-causes-cancer videos and “holistic health coaches” promoting “natural” views, this trend is becoming increasingly important to everyday knowers, especially under the greater influence of conspirituality.
This paper aims to evaluate the epistemic “worthiness” of the anti-sunscreen movement (ASM) on three fronts of potential epistemic advantage: social benefit, epistemic leisure, and epistemic efficacy. I deliberate on how these advantages promote (or demote) clarity: the satisfactory termination of an investigation (Nguyen, 2021). As a reinforcing tool, I compare the promotion of clarity in these measures against a normative learning activity: being taught that sunscreen is beneficial in a public classroom by a health-educated teacher.
Useful terms
I shall use some definitions relevant to my evaluation: conspiracy theory shall be “a theory about conspiracies” (Keeley 1999, Coady 2012, Pigden in press, as cited in Dentith 2017, p. 2244). Conspiracy theorizing shall be partaking in activity pertaining to conspiracy theories. Finally, clarity, in my use, shall be the satisfactory termination of a justificatory investigation (Nguyen, 2021).
The anti-sunscreen movement
While there are variations of the ASM, the version I aim to examine has the following tenets (Daviess, 2024):
The Sun does not cause cancer. Unprotected exposure provides health benefits.
Ingredients in sunscreen cause cancer (or present health disadvantages).
“Big Pharma” or the established pharmaceutical industry aims to promote use of medicinal products associated with the treatment of sun-screen-related illnesses to secure higher profit.
Deliberating the overall epistemic value of ASM against a normative epistemic scenario: is it worthwhile?
I will present three fronts of reasonable benefit I have identified as potential epistemic arenas for partaking in ASM and evaluate their conduciveness towards epistemic clarity against a normative learning activity. Examples I provide are from real-world online groups, though, due to privacy concerns, I have chosen not to reveal their identities.
As social benefit
It is not an unreasonable assumption to argue that conspiracy theorizing lends itself to a certain sense of community. Emerging scholarly attention to psychological motives for conspiracy theorizing often include social motives; Douglas et al (2017), for instance, posit that conspiracy theorizing may be a defense against societal prejudices or threats against positive group- or self-image, and that it may serve to reinforce narcissistic beliefs about the superiority of an in-group “paired with a belief that other people do not appreciate it enough” (p.540). As an epistemic consequence, “epistemic bubbles” or “echo chambers” (Nguyen, 2020) seem likely to emerge – narcissistic motives and strict in-group out-group bounds, especially with a defensive slant, are reasonably conducive to actively excluding external knowledge sources or, in a weaker form, passively select for certain knowledge claims. It should also be noted that the overall outcomes of these social motives often differ from expectations: conspiracy theorizing tends to reinforce the same feelings of alienation and moral discontent that led to doing so in the first place (Douglas et al 2017, p. 540).
Regardless of its poor outcomes, might social conspiracy communities still have clarity-promoting benefits? I turn to a popular public alternative medicines Facebook group whose “About” section rejects the space as a “corrupt news dump” for Big Pharma in favour of “collective [health] experiences”. Socialized epistemic activity thrives here: threads asking for “natural” or “toxin-free” sunscreen alternatives are popular, though these terms are not clearly defined. Comments either contain polite suggestions – largely plant oils or tallow, specific “clean” products, or appeal to an app called Yuka for verifying ingredients - or warnings about further health implications, including links to wellness blogs and podcasts. Some reject the use of sunscreen at all. Several observations about clarity arise. First, in contrast to a teacher claiming that sunscreen is beneficial to a student group, there is no clear epistemic authority to appeal to; commentors often do not provide sources for their claims. Sources, when provided, are often links to “unofficial” accounts of sunscreen toxicity, including wellness blogs, Youtubers, and other Facebook posts, not healthcare professionals or broader educational bodies. Second, the crowdsourcing nature of this information presents ambiguous use of desired traits like “natural” and “toxin-free”, with some approval of certain manufactured products insofar as they are “naturally-derived”. It is also not clear which comment might be the most compelling for the poster to follow; out of the nearly 130 strangers with no apparent connection to the poster, which one might be most trustworthy? Third, while there is a reaction feature available for the comments, whether this is helpful as a socialized justificatory measure is unclear. In contrast, a classroom would not introduce the claim as democratic. It may even take counter-measures to ensure the idea is accepted, such as presenting authoritative evidence from a school nurse. Other students may be inclined to correct the deviating claim. Fourth, the most-reacted comment warned against app use as a “pay-to-play" activity: this suggests that even the tangential questions presented in a community setting - “Is an app a trustworthy verification resource?” may terminate the primary investigation by way of limiting, or fast-tracking, associated investigatory measures. In this way, clarity can be gained more quickly, and, while these ambiguous choices might be confusing, they are limited by the specificity of the suggestions and questions that follow. No commenters have replied that sunscreen is not harmful, after all. The investigation is terminated; the poster slathers themselves in tallow or Babo Botanicals Mineral Sunscreen, still uncertain of how “natural” it is, but unable to find conclusive answers.
As epistemic leisure
Might someone choose to endorse anti-sunscreen theories for fun? Levy (2022) examines “serious play” in conspiracy theorizing, where gamification tendencies and certain relationships to evidence can be explained by the agent’s lack of serious belief in the theories they promote. Granted, posts on product suggestions like those for sunscreen seem serious, but I shall look to its broader place in “conspirituality” as a field of play. It is reasonable to say that the alternative thinking present in conspiracy theorizing fand alternative medicine go hand in hand; coined the “New Age” movement, “technocratic medicine” is complemented or rejected by methods that promote the holistic well-being of the body, mind, and soul, including psychosomatic health, “esoteric teachings”, and meditation, respectively (Baer 2003, p.235). Though not explicitly conspiritual, the situation of ASM in a broader health movement makes the rejection of other scientific claims in the face of conspiratorial “truths” possible within its other parts. Other examples include raw foodism, which can be attributed to conspiracies regarding “chemicals” added in food processing, or the anti-vaccine sentiments due to “vaccine injury”.
While the gamification of anti-sunscreen in particular seems limited, there are definitely gamifiable features of its broader health-seeking context that do not require genuine belief. As a movement occurring in conjunction with a “mainstream” version, there is a possibility of those who transitioned from one to the other or feel uncertain about de facto participation in the common group. Baer (2003) observes, for instance, the major motives of several medical doctors to transition to holistic health advocacy, which includes personal encounters with illness that scientific medicine could not treat and social-spiritual experiences that changed their worldviews overall (p.236). As such, it is plausible that genuine belief be suspended as the individual investigates their uncertainty, seeks entertainment or profit from alternative spaces, or feels compelled by alternative elements while having roots in scientific practice originally. Gamifying this process might look like alternative medicine advocacy – especially for income – to interested groups, engaging in alternative health communities to provoke responses for entertainment or curiosity, or endorsing holistic products to friends and family (especially “natural” product multi-level marketing, which is highly target-oriented) despite potentially poor or average experiences with the product themselves. These do emerge in anti-sunscreen threads: commenters often suggest Young Living or Doterra - high-profile pyramid-scheme sources - for sunscreen products, making their interest in the question a gamified investment. Other posters seem highly contrarian, rejecting sunscreen use at all or suggesting certain supplements to ingest to boost "natural” protection.
Does this “make-believe” element in the ASM or conspirituality become conducive to gaining clarity on the matter? I argue that it does; a deep-dive into alternative health from the view of someone skeptical may open more investigatory measures than someone not. These measures may also be more rigorous if the agent is looking to reject existing beliefs. Even if playing an online persona for profit or otherwise, great epistemic investment is needed to adopt the language and behaviours of those in the community, such as that of “toxins” and “chemicals”, “researching” ingredients, or conducting “detoxes”. If doing so for profit, the agent may need to become an epistemic resource themselves; despite the titles “health coach”, “wellness coach”, and “motivational coach” being unregulated professions in Canada (ALIS), certification programs are emerging, such as the Health Coach diploma from York University. For this degree of investment, however, lack of genuine belief does seem unlikely, but not impossible; clarity, however, is achieved with more justificatory rigor in this scenario.
As epistemic efficiency
Is the ASM justified? Did members of the ASM simply reach a better-evidenced conclusion more effectively than those not involved in alternative health circles? Yes, and no. While some claims seem to be at least tangential to well-evidenced fact, sweeping, difficult-to-evidence conclusions are often made, such as “sunscreens are generally dangerous because of harmful ingredients”, or “unprotected sun exposure leads to better health outcomes, in general, than using sunscreen”. It seems that, in lack of broader understanding of efficacy and safety claims about sunscreen, ASM proponents fail to exact their investigations more carefully. For instance, in 2021, Johnson & Johnson recalled five aerosol sunscreen products for containing the carcinogen benzene; benzene, however, is not a standard ingredient in commercial sunscreens, nor is it approved by the American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use in sunscreens (James, 2022). In this case, the claim "sunscreen causes cancer” is not entirely false but is strongly misled. Reliable epistemic authorities are also in question; while the FDA may condemn benzene, the safety other active ingredients in sunscreen have been deemed inconclusive, with “insufficient data” (EWG).
Again, clarity seems to be gained rather quickly – sensationalized information, headlines, alternative-product marketing – but the justificatory bases seem to be lacking. Why do some sunscreens contain benzene? Do all sunscreens contain benzene? What is benzene, exactly? These investigations seem to have been terminated too prematurely for the agent to fully grasp the implications of the claim, “Sunscreen causes cancer”. Other common active ingredients in sunscreen have not been explicitly deemed safe by the FDA like its approval of zinc oxide and titanium, so claims of their harm may, in fact, be true; however, there is no evidenced connection to Big Pharma that seek profits on this measure specifically. Justification for this claim seems to be begging the question: “Why would Big Pharma reveal this to us?” is suitable but terminating. “We may never know, I suppose,” is the only possible response.
Conclusion
In all, there do seem to be epistemically positive traits present in conspiracy theorizing. They can help to fast-track investigations and, as seen in three examples, gain epistemic clarity that much more quickly. They not only terminate primary investigations – in this case, “Does sunscreen cause cancer?” - but secondary ones: “What ingredients in sunscreen cause cancer?” on the basis of, not complex, but simple, evidence: “Big Pharma seeks profit on our ill health, so we can’t know, but we can be careful”. The social benefit, leisure benefit, and efficiency benefit all seem conducive to this premature sort of clarity.
Is this epistemically worthwhile, overall? I argue not. While clarity can be achieved more quickly, satisfactory justification for these claims is not: with ambiguous use of terms (“natural”, “toxin-free”), uncertain epistemic authorities (unregulated health coaches, Facebook posts, suggestions from contradicting strangers), and overall additional epistemic effort in the decision-making required to choose which path to follow, it seems more reliable, and more epistemically satisfying, to trust the science. However,f some claims did, like with the J&J recall, have some truth to them; indeed, misinformation around sunscreen seem to speak more to a need for public engagement with evidence, greater social awareness in healthcare, and improved education surrounding consumer products, rather than a rational fault of consumers themselves.
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